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historical property thatmakes certain objects special. Critically, chil-
dren as young as age 4 reason about authentic objects in an essential-
ist manner (Frazier & Gelman 2009; Gelman et al. 2014). Because
the essencelike effects of ownership appear early and persist into
adulthood, it is unlikely that they are some later by-product of psy-
chological essentialism. Thus, at least some element of historical in-
formationmust be accounted for by any comprehensive explanation
of psychological essentialism.
Historical information plays an important role in considerations
of ownership and authenticity, a role that highlights several gray
areas with respect to the inherence heuristic. First, is the separa-
tion between intrinsic and extrinsic information detailed by C&S
meaningful? There are at least two effects of this dichotomy on
the model: (1) a separation between internal features (e.g.,
DNA, insides, essences) and external features (e.g., conventions,
surface details), and (2) a division between features that are
salient and accessible and those that are not. These two elements
travel together in the examples presented by C&S, but ownership
is a case where the two might be split apart, unless one conceptu-
alizes ownership in a very specific way (i.e., as an intrinsic feature
that is historically, and therefore externally, defined – but whether
this is possible is an empirical question).
Second, can historical information play a role in the output of the
inherence heuristic?Historical information plays a critical role in de-
finingproperty (Gelmanet al. 2012) and authenticobjects (Frazier&
Gelman 2009). Ownership information is accessible and salient in
exactly the way that other kinds of historical information, such as
social conventions and historical events, are not. In its current
formulation, the inherence heuristic states that the mental shotgun
selects inherent features because they are salient and accessible,
but there is no requirement that they be internal or intrinsic. Al-
though it may be true that inherent features are overrepresented
in human explanation, perhaps because they are salient and accessi-
ble, does the model need to be limited to inherent features?
Finally, can the inherence heuristic effectively serve as the foun-
dation for psychological essentialism if it accounts only for essential-
ist thinking within a subset of domains? The inherence heuristic is a
process that is proposed to explain broad patterns, and the relation-
ship between individuals and property is consistent and systemic.
More specifically, people treat property as though it is imbued
with the essence of current and prior owners. Historical information
is central to concepts of ownership, and historical pathmay be an im-
portant element of essentialism, especially with respect to artifacts
(see Frazier & Gelman 2009). However, in its current formulation,
the inherence heuristic does not account for authenticity and
other effects of ownership. Thus, the inherence heuristic appears
to be well situated to address how we think about the intrinsic prop-
erties that underliemany human intuitions, but if this process is truly
the foundation for psychological essentialism, then it needs to
address historical information in some contexts.
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Abstract: This commentary highlights the importance of attending to the
sociocultural contexts that foster essentialist ideas. It contends that
Cimpian & Salomon’s (C&S’s) model undervalues the extent to which
the development of essentialist beliefs is contingent on social
experience. The result is a restriction of the model’s applicability to real-
world instances of essentialism-fuelled prejudice and discrimination.
Psychological essentialism is a pervasive pattern of thinking that
has been implicated in a host of unpleasant societal processes.
As such, the endeavour of Cimpian & Salomon (C&S) to elucidate
the roots of this psychological tendency is an important undertak-
ing. However, we argue that the model they have developed
sustains one clear void: Namely, it underplays the influence of
social factors on the development of essentialist beliefs, particular-
ly when those beliefs pertain to social groups.
C&S contend that the origins of psychological essentialism lie
in the “inherence heuristic,” which they present as a product of
basic, potentially innate properties of the human cognitive
system. Within their model of the development of essentialism,
social factors are relegated to a subsidiary role. The basic tendency
to make essentialist assumptions is cognitively prescribed, and
social experience simply furnishes the surface content that
allows these essentialist principles to be developed into culturally
sensible narratives. However, this jars with the extensive body of
theoretical and empirical literature that suggests that the process,
as well as the content, of thought is socio-culturally shaped (Fiske
et al. 1998). As children mature, they are socialised into a commu-
nity of minds from whom they learn the appropriate ways of
representing the world around them. This premise opens the pos-
sibility that patterns of essentialist thinking may be acquired, or at
least formatively moulded, as a result of people’s encounters with
the social world. Indeed, research shows that the propensity to
engage in essentialist thought (as well as the precise content of
essentialist ideas) varies systematically across cultural groups,
including those differentiated by religion (Birnbaum et al. 2010;
Diesendruck & Haber 2009), nationality (Mahalingam &
Rodriguez 2003), social status (Mahalingam & Rodriguez 2006),
political conservatism (Rhodes & Gelman 2009), and race
(Jayaratne et al. 2009). This suggests that social experience can
affect the very impulse to think in essentialist terms, rather than
merely supplying the narratives that are tacked onto the funda-
mental, cognitively given precepts.
C&S acknowledge the proposition that essentialist thinking is a
product of socialisation, but dismiss this hypothesis as implausible.
The sole empirical grounds provided for this position relates to the
failure of research to detect sufficient evidence of overt transmis-
sion of essentialism within parent–child conversations. Verbalised
parent–child interaction is, however, an extremely narrow proxy
for the whole spectrum of social influences on individual cogni-
tion. Engagement with the social world occurs through many
channels – through institutions such as the mass media, education,
commercial markets, and politics, as well as immediate verbal and
non-verbal interpersonal interactions. All such means of commu-
nication are viable vectors of essentialist ideas.
As an example of one such channel of social influence, research
has suggested that the popular diffusion of scientific knowledge
can propagate essentialist representations of particular social
groups (Dar-Nimrod & Heine 2011). Recent research on media
coverage of neuroscience shows that a key way in which neurosci-
ence is communicated to the public is via emphasising that differ-
ences between social groups are biologically rooted (O’Connor
et al. 2012). This neuro-essentialism of social categories is
exemplified by the ubiquitous trope of “the [adjective] brain”
(e.g., “the male brain,” “the gay brain,” “the criminal brain”),
which expressly condenses the essence of a given category into
the notion of a distinctive brain type that is universally shared
by all category members. The proliferation of such messages
within the public sphere may trigger essentialist thinking in
those who encounter them. Experimental research has shown
that exposing people to information about the purported bioge-
netic foundations of, for example, gender (Brescoll & LaFrance
2004; Coleman & Hong 2008) or race (Keller 2005; No et al.
2008; Williams & Eberhardt 2008) exacerbates essentialist
beliefs and corresponding processes of stereotyping and discrim-
ination. Though C&S acknowledge that biological information
can be recruited into the “stories” that elaborate inherence-
based assumptions, they do not consider whether exposure to
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this biological information might itself cultivate essentialist beliefs,
which would not otherwise have emerged.
The model’s relative neglect of social influence restricts its appli-
cability to real-world instances of essentialism-fuelled prejudice and
discrimination. Although the authors acknowledge that the content
of essentialist beliefs can deviate between category domains, they
do not engage with the evidence that different human categories
attract varying levels of essentialism (Haslam et al. 2000; Joffe &
Staerklé 2007). An account of essentialism that hinges on a basic cog-
nitive bias cannot elucidate why, for example, categories relating to
eye colour do not elicit the level of essentialism that is directed at
categories relating to gender or race. Without due attention to the
modulating influence of societal processes, the model cannot
address the key question of why particular social groups, within
particular historical contexts, become constituted as homogeneous,
immutable, and denigrated entities. Neither does it aid in discrimi-
nating between those contexts in which essentialist identities are
internalised by marginalised groups, and cases where oppressive es-
sentialist identities are actively challenged and resisted (Mahalingam
2007). Indeed, characterising essentialism as a product of instinctive
cognitive mechanisms may lend an air of inevitability, obscuring the
processes by which change can be effected in the essentialism that
particular groups in society face.
Undoubtedly, essentialist beliefs are premised upon cognitive
(and affective) patterns, and these merit empirical elaboration.
However, social contexts shape how these basic cognitive tenden-
cies manifest and hence their implications for individuals and
society. In building an account of essentialism that foregrounds in-
stinctual cognition to the exclusion of formative social factors,
C&S’s model may itself exemplify an inherence-based explana-
tion. It thereby risks eliding the social interests and agendas that
selectively channel the malignancies of essentialism towards
particular sectors of society.
Is psychological essentialism an inherent
feature of human cognition?
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Abstract:Recent evidence shows that psychological essentialism is neither
a universal nor stable feature of human cognition. The extent to which
people report essentialist intuitions varies enormously across cultures
and education levels, and is also influenced by subtle, normatively
irrelevant contextual manipulations. These results challenge the notion
that the human mind is “fitted” with a built-in inherence heuristic that
produces essentialist intuitions.
A major goal of the article by Cimpian & Salomon (C&S), as stated
by the authors themselves (see sect. 4), is to argue that their pro-
posed inherence heuristic provides the cognitive foundation on
which psychological essentialism emerges. In doing so, the
authors seem to take it as a given that psychological essentialism
is a fundamental feature of the human mind that needs to be
explained.
However, recent evidence suggests that psychological essential-
ism may not be a universal or immutable human tendency. In a
recent set of studies (Machery et al., submitted), we examined
the stability of psychological essentialism. The participants in
our studies were asked, for example, whether lemons that
undergo a chemical transformation, which alters their exterior
properties (e.g., taste and appearance) but conserves their
genetic structure, would still be considered lemons, or
(conversely) whether a liquid discovered on a distant planet that
shares all the functional and superficial properties of water,
despite having a completely different molecular structure,
should be called “water.” An essentialist position would define a
category of things (or kind) by their stable, underlying properties.
Thus, according to a true essentialist, lemons that undergo a
superficial transformation while retaining their genetic structure
would still be lemons, whereas the alien liquid would not be con-
sidered water (since its molecular structure is different) regardless
of how closely it resembles, tastes like, or fulfills the same role as
water. Thus, by tallying the proportion of participants who believe
the lemon remains a lemon in the chemical transformation sce-
nario, or that the alien liquid is not water in the discovery scenario,
we can estimate which proportion of a given sample holds essen-
tialist beliefs.
The first study considered essentialist intuitions in 10 different
nations spread across four continents. We found that the likeli-
hood of holding essentialist intuitions varied dramatically (and sig-
nificantly) across cultures, from less than 10% of participants in a
particular country holding essentialist beliefs to more than 70% of
those in another country holding these intuitions. Furthermore,
these intuitions were found to vary significantly with gender and
education. A second study showed that the type of scenario (trans-
formation vs. discovery) and the category (organic/biological vs.
physical/chemical) both significantly (and independently) influ-
enced the likelihood that participants reported essentialist intui-
tions. Finally, a third study showed that merely varying how we
framed the (same) question in a transformation scenario signifi-
cantly altered the likelihood that participants would report essen-
tialist intuitions.
Taken together, the aforementioned studies show that, far from
being universal, essentialist beliefs vary dramatically across cul-
tures, gender, and educational levels –much like many other phil-
osophical intuitions (e.g., Machery et al. 2004; 2009). These
studies also show that, far from being stable, the likelihood that
people hold essentialist intuitions varies considerably with norma-
tively irrelevant contextual factors, such as the type of scenario
used to elicit beliefs or the way the question is being framed.
The results of our studies are consistent with a small, but
important, literature on cross-cultural variation in psychological es-
sentialism and on the role of social factors in the prevalence of es-
sentialism. There is substantial variation regarding which
properties are thought to be immutable as well as caused by inter-
nal features. Pfeffer et al. (1998) found that British children are
more likely than Nigerian children to view criminal behavior as im-
mutable and internally caused. Giles et al. (2008) also found that
Black South African children are more likely than African-Ameri-
can children to view aggression as inborn and immutable. Giles
et al. argue that this finding is consistent with the social role of es-
sentialism in justifying inequalities during apartheid (see also
Mahalingam 2003b). There is also substantial variation across cul-
tures and social groups regarding which categories are essential-
ized. Mahalingam (2003a) has shown that the Aravanis of India (a
minority of biological men who dress and live as women) essential-
ize the female gender, but not themale gender, holding that amale
can become a woman by cross-dressing. Mahalingam (2003b) has
also provided evidence suggesting that Brahmins and Dalits in
India essentialize the Indian castes differently. It would thus
seem that, far from being a default mode of thinking, essentialism
is used strategically, in a contextual manner, often to fulfill some
political goals (see also Pereira et al. 2010).
In sum, a growing of body research suggests that psychological
essentialism is neither a universal nor stable feature of human cog-
nition. Consequently, this research challenges the notion that the
human mind is “fitted” with a built-in inherence heuristic that pro-
duces essentialist intuitions.
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